Universals strike back! Remarks on Krzysztof Chodasewicz’s notion of multiple realization of life
In this paper, I argue against the use of the notion of multiple realization to defend a unified account of life, as proposed by Krzysztof Chodasewicz. I show that the notion of multiple realization is itself highly problematic but, most importantly, it cannot warrant antireductionist claims traditionally associated with it. In particular, it is unable to block both traditional reduction and mechanistic causal reduction. To make matters worse, multiple realization is theoretically laden, which makes it very dif f icult to defend the claim that life is irreducible because there may, at least in principle, be theoretical contexts, in which it is construed of in a fashion that would even require reduction to its molecular bases. I argue that the appeal to the notion of an abstract type (or universal) can, and should, replace appeals to multiply realized types.