W obronie przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego

  1. Maria Bielawka


In defence of the purely intentional object

In his book Studia z problematyki realizmu–idealizmu Marek Rosiak tends to exclude the purely intentional object (in the meaning given to the term by Roman Ingarden) from his theory of minimal realism. In our opinion, this solution is not correct. However, the polemic presented in this paper does not apply to the so-called “perceptual” purely intentional objects which, as Roman Ingarden suggests in his Controversy over the Existence of the World, occur within our perceptual acts alongside other intentional objects (non-purely intentional ones). One should agree with Marek Rosiak that perceptual purely intentional objects do not exist.
We try to defend the conception of the purely intentional object regarding entities that are created (however, not ex nihilo) by transcendental consciousness, such as imaginations, projects, results of scientific research, works of art, etc.
The Ingardenian category (in the meaning mentioned above) seems to provide an adequate ontological description. It shows that besides ideal objects, “real” objects, and transcendental consciousness there is still another ontic group, existentially weaker, to which common rules, including logical ones, do not apply.

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Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

10, 2015, z. 2

Pages from 79 to 89

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